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BROADBAND ROUTER SECURITY: HISTORY,
CHALLENGES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Patryk Szewczyk and Rose Macdonald
Edith Cowan University, Western Australia

ABSTRACT
Consumer grade broadband routers are integral to accessing the Internet and are primarily
responsible for the reliable routing of data between networks. Despite the importance of
broadband routers, security has never been at the forefront of their evolution. Consumers are
often in possession of broadband routers that are rich in consumer-orientated features yet riddled
with vulnerabilities that make the routers susceptible to exploitation. This amalgamation of
theoretical research examines consumer grade broadband routers from the perspective of how they
evolved, what makes them vulnerable, how they are targeted, and the challenges concerning the
application of security. The research further explores the Australian roll out of a joint ISP ;
consumer extended public Wi-Fi network (Air), in which routers play crucial roles. The security
of these networks is considered, and questions are explored, regarding consumer legal risks,
particularly for consumers who opt-in to extend this service. This research paper concludes with
recommendations for the development and introduction of Australian router security deployment
standards.

l. INTRODUCTION
Australia is consistently identified as a major
Internet user that will continue to be targeted
by cybercrime. Some protection is afforded by
specialised security software for computers.
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL)
routers can complement specialised security
software in counteracting the severity of
cybercriminal activity. For the ADSL router to
provide a layer of security, it requires adequate
and an appropriate selection of security
mechanisms and controls. The ADSL router
typically operates in a discreet, reliable manner
within Small office Home office (SoHo)
environments - typically forgotten once the
initial configuration phase passes. However,
there is continual increase in research evidence
depicting cyber-attacks specifically targeting or
exploiting vulnerabilities within ADSL routers.
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Rumours
further
indicate that
known
vulnerabilities within ADSL routers may
purposefully go unaddressed, allowing specific
organisations remote access to a target
network (Greenberg, 2017). The ongoing cyberattacks demonstrate the need to protect an
ADSL router correctly - using best practices
and standards.
ADSL routers (also known as 'broadband
routers,' but referred to hereafter as just
'routers') are essential in providing reliable
network connectivity between computers,
printers, tablets, the Internet of Things (IoT),
and the Internet. The connections form
networks, which may be small local networks,
or larger external networks linking thousands
of devices across vast areas. The required
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network topology, scale, and purpose dictate
the type or category of router hardware chosen
to establish the connections. While enterprise
grade routers provide the highest levels of
functionality at a premium price, the vast
majority of small business and residential
premises do not require the premium
functionality.
The
small
business
and
residential market typically opt for SoHo
routers, which provide consumers with the
desired
functionality
and
an
intuitive
Graphical User Interface (GUI) to simplify the
configuration process.
Vendors continually incorporate advanced
features and technologies into routers making
them increasingly attractive to consumers.
Common router features typically include a
four-port Ethernet switch, high-speed wireless
networking capabilities, network file sharing,
printer servers, and scalability for integration
with smart home technologies within a home
network.
These additional features whilst
attractive to consumers may also create a
range of supplementary vulnerabilities. The
exploited vulnerabilities may have enabled
cyber criminals to access a private network in
an unauthorised manner.
Routers are the "work horses" of the SoHo
Internet , controlling the flow of data between
private and public networks. Unfortunately,
there are ongoing security flaws embedded
within routers, which may expose users and
data to intrusions, through a range of attack
vectors. Cyber criminals who recognise the
opportunities and benefits in being able to
control or remotely access routers for personal
gain can exploit the security flaws within
routers. For novice end-users, the router is
often the only barrier segregating the user's
data from the Internet. Many router
vulnerabilities stem from poor firmware
development
and
a
lack of ongoing
maintenance (Hampton & Szewczyk, 2015). In
contrast, users also poorly configure routers
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during
the
initial
configuration
stage
(Szewczyk,
2006).
Inadequate
security
configuration may be attributed to end-users
lacking accurate knowledge and an appropriate
skillset to apply the ideal security settings.
Despite end-users typically ridiculed for
inadequately securing their routers, research
has demonstrated that vendors are equally to
blame with poor or inaccurate product
literature to support and guide end-users
through the configuration phase (Szewczyk,
2013).

2. HISTORY AND
EVOLUTION OF
NETWORK ROUTERS
The foundations of network routing were
developed in the late 1960s by a closed
academic group of researchers known as the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
The goal of the agency was to build a network
of four Interface Message Processors (IMPs) to
send data over phone lines. ARP A put out a
tender for the development, which was won by
a small company known as Bolt, Beranek and
Newman (BBN) (Raytheon, 2011). In August
1968, the BBN group used "an off-the-shelf
Honeywell 516 to design the I/ O devices that
would need to be added to the basic model to
start writing the code that would reload
crashed IMPs, pull packets into the machine,
figure out how to route them, and send them
on their way" (Raytheon, para.4, 2011).
On October ist, 1969, the first set of
characters were successfully transmitted over
the new network and the Advanced Research
Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) was
founded. The IMP could support 50Kbps links
between
nodes
(Duffy,
2009).
The
achievements of the group remained confined
to those at ARP A, BBN and a small group of
researchers until 1972, when a project titled,
"The Technology of Packet Switching" was
presented at the International Conference on
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Computer Communication
(Raytheon, 2011).

in

Washington

In 1980, Stanford University was the
recipient of several Alto workstations and
Ethernet networking boards from the Xerox
Palo Alto Research Centre. Collectively,
Stanford University staff and graduate
students used this technology to develop what
later became known as the 'Blue Box.' The
Blue Box functioned as a multiprocessor,
providing the capability for Stanford's schools
and departments to communicate with each
other. William Yeager, a research engineer at
Stanford's medical school, had just completed
writing a small routing program, which acted
to connect computers in the medical
department with those in the computer science
department (Carey, 2001). Yeager's software
program was a "multiprotocol network that
linked Alto workstation, mainframes, minicomputers and printers" (Carey, 2001). Yeager
went on to writing a more sophisticated
program, which was able to route several
protocols including the relatively new Internet
Protocol (IP). Yeager's advanced software was
designed for the twenty-four Stanford Blue
Boxes that could be seen around the campus
during that time (Carey, 2001).
In 1985, two Stanford staff members, Len
Bosack and Sandy Lerner, who had been
involved in the Blue Box project, allegedly
asked Yeager for his software code so they
could modify it to route only Internet
Protocols. Controversially, in the previous
year, Bosack and Lerner had founded a
company called Cisco, and used Yeager's work
to propel the development of Cisco products.
This became the subject of legal debate in
future years (Carey, 2001). Bosack and Lerner
would later return the capacity for Yeager's
code to route protocols other than just IP ,
enhancing the functionality of the products
they
developed.
Through
1986,
Cisco
introduced its first commercial multiprotocol
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router, called the Advanced Gateway Server
(AGS) into the communications market , which
supported the Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP), Internet Protocol (IP) TCP / IP (Duffy,
2009).
IP router architecture has continued to
evolve m step with the complex and
sophisticated networks of the protocols they
support. Today, a SoHo router may "fully
utilize the capabilities of specialized hardware
and
integrates
an
endless
suite
of
functionalities, ranging from raw packet
forwarding through traffic shaping, packet
queuing, access control, Network Address
Translation (NAT) with connection tracking
all the way to distributed network protocols"
(Csaszar, Enyedi, Ridell, Retvari, & Sjodin,
2012). There was one critical oversight made
by engineers, developers and researchers who
actualised the future of our communications.
The oversight was security, and through its
absence, forged a mindset of functionality over
secure communications that persists today.

3. ROUTERS AS AN
ATTACK PLATFORM
The SoHo router is an ideal target for cyber
criminals. Consumers obtain a router through
their Internet Service Provider (ISP) or
purchased online or via a computer retail
outlet. In either instance, the router typically
encompasses minimal or no security by default.
The lack of security reduces the cumbersome
task of progressing through the configuration
phase for the novice end-user. However,
minimal security on the router also simplifies
the attack process for cyber criminals. A
successful attack on the router may reward the
cyber criminal with direct access to the
router's operating system (firmware) , to the
prized internal network consisting of all the
connected devices, and to the data stored and
traversing the network. As the inclusion of IoT
and smart devices continues to further increase
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in quantity within home environments, there
are additional incentives for cyber criminals
who exploit the router and network. From
such a privileged position, the intruder can
control the network whilst accessing and
misusing the data stolen from it. The
consequences for the victim may include loss of
personal information, financial data, account
passwords, and their identity.
Vulnerabilities associated with coding flaws
in the firmware development stage is an
ongoing issue. Yang (2016) highlighted this
issue in a DEFCON presentation in 2015.
Yang, (2016) discovered a number of zero day
vulnerabilities in his work as a security
researcher and ethical hacker on a range of
SoHo centric routers. Vulnerabilities included
vendor backdoors, debug interfaces left active,
concerns with the ease at which intruders
could gain access to shells, arbitrary file reads,
stack overflows and unauthorised remote
access via services such as Universal Plug and
Play (UPnP) (Yang, 2016). Security researcher
Pierre Kim publicly disclosed a large quantity
of zero day vulnerabilities for D-Link routers in
2017, following numerous failed communication
attempt to inform D-Link of the security issues
(Osborne, 2017; Kim, 2017). The reluctance by
vendors to listen to security researchers and
the community who discover vulnerabilities
further
demonstrates
the
issues
with
progressively
addressing
known
security
vulnerabilities within routers.
Irrespective
of
ethics,
all
system
penetrations begin with reconnaissance, and
search engines such as Shodan.io provide a
perfect opportunity for attackers to identify
vulnerable targets and gather intelligence.
Shodan.io purports to be the "world's first
search engine for Internet connected devices,"
(Shodan.io, 2016) otherwise known as the
Internet of Things (IoT). Users can access all
the features of the search engine, which can
pull information from thousands of different
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sources. Shodan.io is proving to be a powerful
tool for identifying vulnerable clients, and to
demonstrate its capacity a number of search
queries
targeting SoHo connections to
micro httpd servers were conducted in this
research. The results were troublesome with
615,000 SoHo routers identified with open
ports in response to one search query (port:80
micro_ httpd). Similar searches were run on
other popular servers such as Apache (port:80
Appache httpd) which returned more than
2,000 vulnerable router hits.
Valuable
information is presented to the user in the
search results, including the business or
company name of the target, location, IP
address, name and model of the router, and
the ports and services that are open. A
convenient link is also provided directing the
user to the router's web interface page where
default usernames and passwords can be
tested. If successful, the attacker may proceed
with a range of attacks as depicted in the
following section, thus compromising multiple
hosts.

4. ATTACKS ON SOHO
ROUTERS
4 .1

Cross-Site Request Forgery

The aim of a Cross-Site Request Forgery
(CSRF) attack is to direct the user to a web
page controlled by the attacker where
malicious code is embedded in web pages. The
code acts to transfer sensitive data to the
attacker without the knowledge of the enduser. Account details, passwords, financial
information, and other sensitive information is
stolen in this process. Routers are vulnerable
to CSRF attacks because they are usually
configured with through a web browser
connected to an embedded web server within
the router. On successful completion of such an
attack, the router's Domain Name System
(DNS) entries may be altered or device
settings altered to make the targeted network
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additionally susceptible to attacks (Router
Check, 2016). Land (2017) discovered that 54%
of examined routers contained a CSRF specific
vulnerability.
Despite
many
routers
encompassing
a
CSRF
vulnerability
(Rotenberg et al., 2017) , D-Link routers are at
the forefront of largest quantity of devices
encompassing the issue (CVE-2015-5999, 2015;
CVE-2017-5633, 2017; CVE-2017-6411, 2017;
CVE-2017-7398, 2017) with exploits focusing
on altering the configuration, or diminishing
the overall state of security.

4. 2

InfoITI1ation Disclosure

Information Disclosure attacks are categorised
by attempts to acquire specific system
information through the CPE (Customer
Premises Equipment) WAN (Wide Area
Network) Management Protocol (CWMP).
Technical support personnel within ISP
departments leverage CWMP to remotely
trouble shoot or administer changes to routers.
In 2015, several Netgear SoHo routers were
identified as having an information disclosure
issue that allowed attackers to access
unauthorised information (Constantin, 2014).
The vulnerability exploited the Simple Object
Access Protocol (SOAP) by "sending HTTP
requests with a
blank form and a
'SOAP Action' header" ( Constantin, 2014).
Administrator information including the
model, serial number, and firmware version of
the router targeted which was available to
intruders (Constantin, 2014). The CWMP
service facilitated a variant of the Mirai
malware specifically exploiting SoHo routers
and modems (Antonakakis et al. , 2017). The
extent of the damage caused by the Mirai
malware targeting German focused routers
exceeded 900,000
(Kolias,
Kambourakis,
Stavrou & Voas, 2017).
A directory traversal vulnerability leaves
users open to intruders attacking SoHo routers
remotely. A flaw in the firmware allows
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attackers to access restricted directories, such
as
the
router's
configuration
settings,
administrator password hashes, ISP usernames
and passwords, Wi-Fi passwords and client or
server authentication credentials ( Armasu,
2015). In 2015, one directory traversal
vulnerability appearing in the webproc. cgi
component of the target router allowed an
attacker to extract a config.xml file containing
authentication credentials. In this particular
case, more than 700,000 vulnerable routers
involving multiple vendors were identified. It
was later discovered that each vendor had used
firmware developed by the same third-party
company (Armasu, 2015).

4 .3

CrOE8 Site Scripting

There are three main cross-site scripting
attacks, known as 'Document Object Model'
(DOM), 'Persistent,' and 'Non-persistent
attacks.' In each of the attacks, the intruder
injects malicious JavaScript or HTML code
into the web application of the router. This
provides the attacker with elevated privileges
from which modifications to the firmware
settings result in a network hijack. The
attacker needs to be authenticated by the
router to carry out this attack (Independent
Security Evaluators & Holcomb, 2013).
However, once authenticated targeted data
includes the username and password set up
page of Network Attached Storage (NAS), the
device name of the USB advanced.htm or the
network key to the wireless setup page (NIST,
2014).

4.4

Authentication Bypass

SoHo routers require user authentication to
access the router's web interface where a
variety
of configuration
and
function
modifications occur. Any flaw m the
authentication method that allows an intruder
to gain unauthorised access is considered an
authentication attack. The most basic of these
attacks involves the use of default username
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and passwords, which are easily discoverable.
A number of public websites provide lists of
vendors' default username and password
details. If the owner or administrator of the
targeted router has failed to change the default
authentication credentials, then access to the
router's configuration pages is simplified. An
alternate and common authentication bypass
attack is through Structured Query Language
(SQL) injection technique. An SQL injection
attack operates by running malicious or altered
SQL queries against a database or web server.
A successful SQL injection attack may result
m
unwanted
information
disclosure,
compromised data integrity, compromised data
availability and remote command execution
(CISCO, 2016). Cutlip (2012) examined the
Netgear WNDR3700 series broadband wireless
routers, documenting the presence of a
vulnerability within the miniDLNA server
making the router susceptible to SQL injection,
yielding remote root-level access. Alternate
vendors are not immune to the vulnerability
with
D-Link
encompassing
numerous
Authentication Bypass issues through an SQLInjection vulnerability as per CVE-2013-5945
(CVE-2013-5945, 2013; EDB-ID: 30062, 2013).
UPnP vulnerabilities (SSDP discovery and
SOAP) to the Internet side of the device
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) is a protocol
standard that allows communications between
computers and network-enabled devices. The
protocol is enabled by default on millions of
systems,
including
routers
where
authentication is rarely implemented. The
literature suggests this feature is one of the
most exploitable services available to an
attacker. The issues stem from poor
development and implementation of the
protocol, with much of the literature pointing
to a vast number of systemic security issues.
UPnP enabled routers allow devices and
applications on the network supporting it to
configure themselves and perform port
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forwarding functions without authentication
(Router, 2016).

4 .5

Unencrypted Password
Storage

In 2013, research conducted by RAPID7
identified forty to fifty million networked
enabled devices that were vulnerable to
exploits using the UPnP protocol. Nearly all
the vulnerable devices identified were SoHo
routers. Critically, "sixty percent of routers
tested allowed users to login to their
administrative console using passwords sent
wirelessly via HTTP - clear text broadcasts
over the air: Only 40 percent of the routers
tested provided HTTPS connections and only
20 percent used it by default" (Fogarty, 2014).
This is an unacceptable risk. End-users are
exposed to Man in the Middle attacks (MITM)
where network traffic is intercepted and
directed to the attacker who is primed to
capture these details and use them to further
compromise systems. According to Fogarty,
(2014) the danger is critical if unsecured
wireless services are used, such as those found
in public places, small businesses and closely
packed living environments (Fogarty, 2014).
This is due to signal leak whereby the presence
of wireless access signals are detectable beyond
the boundaries of where it is required.

4 .6

Unauthenticated Hardware
Linking

According to Holcomb (2013) , the Netgear
WNDR7400 router was found to be vulnerable
to an attack which is carried out by sending
HTTP
requests
to the
router's web
management application. The process causes
the routers internal and external storage to
link to an attacker controlled Ready Shared
Cloud Account, which facilitates access to files
hosted by Ready Shared enabled routers.
Ready Share Cloud is a feature provided by
Netgear that allows the consumer to access
remotely a USB storage device that is
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connected to a USB port on the router
(Netgear, 2011). A successful attack will
provide the intruder with access to all files
stored on the external storage of the SoHo
router (Independent Security Evaluators &
Holcomb, 2013).
Remote attackers may modify firewall rules
or access private media files using Digital
Living Network Alliance (DLNA) DLNA is an
industry wide standard that allows data to be
shared over a home network. It includes
organisations and vendors who comply with
the standard to allow music, movies and other
data shared across televisions, smartphones,
computers and other devices. Many routers are
able to link DLNA compliant products across
home networks with the exception of Apple
TV, which is currently not supported
(Laughlin, n.d.). DLNA uses UPnP for media
management, discovery and device control
which simplifies the set up and use of device
streaming across the home network (Charan,
2012). The more devices connected to the
network the greater the opportunities for
attackers to target UPnP vulnerabilities.

4. 7

Buffer Overflows

Buffer overflows are a critical security
vulnerability
that
occurs
because
of
programming errors affecting memory. These
can occur in any operating system. The
consequence of a buffer overflow is that
attackers can inject malicious code into the
buffer and if the code executes; the attacker
can take control of the system. A recent buffer
overflow vulnerability was identified in several
D-Link router models, reported to the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
on 25 August 2016. In this case a "stack-based
buffer overflow in dws/ api/ Login allowed
remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via
a long session cookie" (CVE-2016-5681, 2016).

4. 8

Rerr1.ote Adrriinistration

Enabled
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Remote administration allows the user and
anyone else with credentials to access the
administration page of the user's router over
the Internet from an external location. In order
to remotely access a router, the IP address,
port number and administrative username and
password is entered into a web interface. Users
should disable this feature unless there is a
genuine need to access the router remotely.
This is because enabling remote access is akin
to running an open port, which is an attractive
target to an attacker.
According to Constantin (2014), many
ISPs are deploying SoHo routers to their
customers with remote access enabled, allowing
the vendor to remotely manage and update
devices. CWMP is used to troubleshoot
technical problems remotely (Constantin,
2014). It is estimated that in 2011, 147 million
devices had the CWMP protocol enabled, of
which seventy percent were SoHo routers. The
remote management protocol typically operates
on port 7547 and is the second most commonly
encountered service port after port 80
(Constantin, 2014).

5. CHALLENGES IN
SECURING SOHO
ROUTERS
The myriad of vulnerabilities identified in the
preceding section provides insight into the
challenges facing governments, cyber security
professionals,
vendors,
businesses
and
consumers in securing SoHo routers. Yang
(2016)
suggests that
the practice of
customising open source software to suit a
router
m
combination
with
specific
programmers lacking sufficient knowledge of
programming languages is a significant issue in
developing reliable, bug-free code. Yang's view
is supported through the reverse engineering of
firmware, which demonstrated that some
routers
were
encompassing
security
vulnerabilities exceeding ten years in age
Page 61

JDFSL V12N4
(Hampton & Szewczyk, 2015). Yang (2016)
describes the practice of poor firmware
development as leading to the production of a
range of coding flaws, which are primed for
exploitation. Fogarty (2014) argues that
wireless routers are riddled with security holes
stemming from design goals that focus
usability over security. Given that vendors are
often praised with being first to the market
with innovation, it is not surprising that
security is an aspect that is typically
overlooked.
Routers purchased in-store typically have
security features disabled by default and
backdoors left open. Consumers purchasing
ADSL SoHo routers in-store cannot assume the
device was shipped with security preconfigured. Furthermore, unlike a traditional
operating system, the end-user is not prompted
to update the device during the initial
configuration process. The literature highlights
a persistent mindset of functionality over
security. According to Sericon Technology
(2015), router software issues extend to
vendors, failing to fix problems when identified
coupled with users failing to upgrade firmware
even when a fix may have been made available
for a considerable timeframe. The disconnect
between vendors and end-users creates a risk
focused
environment
with
routers
encompassing
little
security
and
well
documented vulnerabilities circulating in the
'hacking' community.
According to Horowitz (2016), numerous
issues exist when attempting to update router
firmware. These include but not limited to:
updates modifying router settings that the
consumer is unaware of, complicated processes
with poor documentation, methods to update
firmware varying and too often requiring
manual effort, firmware update processes
'bricking' or making the router non-functional,
and a lack of notification of the availability
and importance of an update for consumers.
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Poor firmware update processes are further
extenuated through vendors using 'features' as
a driver to promote firmware updates rather
than security issues being addresses. Unless an
end-user understands a benefit in an advanced
feature set, the likelihood of the update being
applied is diminished.
Programmers may create undocumented
backdoors during the firmware development
phase, so they can interact with products
during
the
development
phase.
The
programmer may wish to save data and test
and/ or modify the program when things go
wrong (Haag, Cummings, & Rea 2016).
Programmers may opt to close backdoors
before the device is released to the public but
may also forget to do so, or purposely leave
one or two open, so they can access the
program post sale. This practice exposes all
routers supporting the firmware to attack and
consequently all the clients associated with it
(Haag et al. , 2016).
The United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT), the Independent
Security Evaluators (ISE), and several security
professionals all highlight concerns about ISPs
deploying
pre-configured
routers.
The
consensus appears to be that too often, routers
are deployed with limited security, and
consumers do not have the knowledge, interest,
or willingness to dedicate the time required to
alter pre-configured settings (US-CERT, 2011).
Researchers in Spain (Folgado, Rodriguez, &
Sanz de Castro, 2017) examined twenty-two
models of SoHo routers from different vendors,
most of which were deployed by ISPs. The
researchers found sixty flaws across the
twenty-two models tested. This further
supports concerns that ISPs do not support
end-users in pursuing a cyber security
conscious mindset.
Vendors and
ISPs
provide limited
information to consumers to assist them in
securing SoHo routers. Szewczyk & Valli
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(2009) described the absence of consumer
support and poorly written documentation as a
significant risk. They were particularly critical
of the quality of vendors' user manuals, citing
a lack of detail, inadequate instruction, the use
continual use of unexplained jargon and a lack
of consistency in content as being major
barriers to consumers having neither the
confidence nor encouragement to implement
adequate security. Szewczyk & Valli (2009)
conducted
an
examination
of
vendor
documentation over a four-year period and
concluded not a single vendor manual could be
described as 'ideal' or adequately support a
novice end-user in applying ideal security
practices to their router. "Attempting to
configure and secure an ADSL router is not
designed to be a trivial task for the average
end-user" (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). This
statement raises the question about who
should be responsible for provisioning adequate
security. End-users need protection, but also
require the set-up of networks to be sufficiently
simple to allow them to participate in and
understand the set-up process. However, if a
router is secured by default, and thus
potentially cumbersome to implement in a
home network - would this process potentially
encourage end-users to purchase an alternate
product with less security but improved
usability.
According
to
Independent
Security
Evaluators (ISE) , (2015) , SoHo routers are
continually vulnerable due to the manner in
which they are deployed and used in locations
such as; coffee shops, libraries, small businesses
and high density living communities where
signals can bleed through walls and someone
could 'listen in'. The ISE report concluded that
compromised routers could be used to perform
a man in the middle attack and thus enabling
a more sophisticated attack to be performed on
devices connected to the router. Specific
threats may include but are not limited to
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network sniffing, traffic rerouting, DNS
poisoning,
denial-of-service
attacks,
or
impersonating servers (Independent Security
Evaluators, 2015).

6. ISP EJVlERGING
ROUTER
DEPLOYlVIENT
Throughout many countries around the world,
ISPs have committed to creating large scale
ISP influenced consumer provisioned public
Wi-Fi networks. Companies such as Fon in
Europe, Comcast in America, and Telstra in
Australia are examples of companies that have
established this shift in our public network
environments. Each scheme works through the
co-operation between the ISP and their
consumers. ISPs deploy routers to their
consumers that are pre-configured to allow the
consumer to 'trade-off' a portion of their home
Internet bandwidth to make it publicly
available for others to use.
the
ISP
provides
the
Essentially,
connection to the Internet and the consumer
extends the ISP's network by turning their
SoHo network into a Wi-Fi hotspot. The
benefit to the participating consumer is that
their 'trade-off' is effectively offset by their
ability to use 'hotspots' provided by other
consumers who have similarly opted into the
program. The commonality amongst users is
they share the same ISP provider and in
Australia, opt-in to the service (Telstra
Corporation Limited [AU], 2016). As part of
their launch, Telstra extended its Telstra Air
free service period to customers until 27 March
2017, and currently boasts 650 thousand
hotspots across Australia (Telstra Corporation
Limited [AU], 2016b). According to Kidman
(2014),
Telstra
anticipates
creating
approximately 2 million hotspots nationwide.
Additional benefits for Telstra customers
include free access to 19 million hotspots
internationally, through Telstra's partnership
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with European Company, Fon
Corporation Limited [AU], 2016b).
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(Telstra

The routers deployed by Telstra for the
'Air' network are named Telstra Gateway and
Gateway Max. Each device supports Hybrid
Fibre Coaxial (HFC), ADSL, VDSL and NBN
and cost $168.00 AUD for the 'Telstra
Gateway' and $264.00 AUD for the 'Gateway
Max.' Consumers can purchase the Air
compatible routers outright or pay through a
subscription
agreement.
Alternatively,
consumers can purchase a day pass for
occasional use. The service requires use of the
Telstra Air application, which is compatible
with iOS and Android devices . The customer
must log in to the application using a
username and password, which ensures all data
used is deducted from the guest user's private
broadband account . The application will search
for and automatically connect the customer's
mobile computing device to the nearest
hotspot when detected, thereby providing
customers with an extended public Wi-Fi
service (Telstra Corporation Limited (AU) ,
2016a) .
Technical security information about the
Telstra Air network and associated hardware is
presently scarce. The Air network does make
use of two SSIDs, one for the public network
and one for the private network and can
operate on either the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz
frequencies. A scan of the local area during this
research identified two public prefixes, namely
Fon Wi-Fi and Telstra-Air. Telstra allows
customers to change the network names, as
long as the public side of the network
encompasses a prefix identifying it as an Air
service.
Instructions on setting up the Telstra
ADSL gateway is presented on the Telstra
website step-by-step with graphical images to
assist customer comprehension. However, no
information is provided with respect to the
configuration of default security settings.
Page 64

Telstra does state that ''your Wi-Fi name and
password can be found on the fridge magnet
you received with your gateway" (Telstra
Corporation Limited [AU], 2016b). This is an
obvious
security
concern
and
it
is
recommended that ISPs avoid providing the
names and corresponding security keys of
customer networks on products that consumers
are likely to keep within 'public' areas of their
homes. Fortunately, Telstra does provide
information on how customers can change
these details and manage other ADSL settings
through the management console. Telstra also
appears committed to ensuring firmware
updates on all devices to remain current,
maintaining a policy of updating firmware
automatically
through
their
remote
management system. The security trade-off of
remote management is perhaps a considered
risk adopted by them and it is hoped that
mitigation
strategies
against
remote
management attacks have been implemented.
Security and other advice is offered to
Telstra customers through their crowd support
and the knowledge base community services.
Telstra (2016) is cautious enough to inform
customers to be careful with Telstra Air
communications, advising communications
between the Wireless Access Point (WAP)
( ADSL
router)
and
device
remains
unencrypted and therefore the service is not
recommended for sensitive communications
such as banking.
"Most public Wi-Fi networks, including
Telstra Air, are unencrypted or open and
potentially unsafe. When you're connecting to
an open network, check for the padlock icon in
the address bar of your device's web browser.
This represents another layer of security. We
recommend not using Telstra Air, or any
public Wi-Fi network, for things like Internet
banking or sending and receiving sensitive
materials. Information for families Public WiFi , including Telstra Air, is available in many
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places across Australia and is easy to access"
(Telstra Corporation Limited [AU], 2016.)
According to Kidman (2014), Telstra has
always intended to deploy 'normal Wi-Fi'
security on the public side of the network and
if Telstra's partner Fon, can be used as a
template to explore security features of Telstra
Air products, it may be inferred that the
default encryption standard is Wi-Fi Protected
Access 2 (WPA2). Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP), WP A and a no encryption option,
often called 'open' are also supported. Fon
devices support three encryption protocols
namely, Temporal Key Integrity Protocol
(TKIP), Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), and TKIP / AES (mixed mode)
(Gustafsson & Thor, 2007). Further research is
required if default and optional setting
configurations provided by Telstra are to be
fully understood and in the best interest of
consumers.
In America, Comcast provides the same or
similar expanded Wi-Fi service through its
'XFINITY' hotspot feature. Like Fon and
Telstra Air, Comcast describes their service to
consumers as an extended Wi-Fi network,
"Your XFINITY Wireless Gateway broadcasts
an additional "xfinitywifi" network signal for
use with XFINITY WiFi. This creates an
extension of the XFINITY WiFi network right
in your home that any XFINITY Internet
subscriber can use to sign in and connect. This
XFINITY WiFi service is completely separate
from your secure WiFi home network"
(Hoffman, 2014a).
Proponents of this consumer extended WiFi network argue that consumers are provided
with greater safeguards when compared to
open public Wi-Fi networks because users
must register and opt-in to use the service,
with all Internet activity linked to the guest's
private user account. Critics point to the ease
in which false accounts or rogue hotspots can
be created, along with fake sign-in pages,
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effectively creating a vacuum from which all
sorts of sensitive data can be stolen.
Consumer-oriented man-in-the-middle devices
such as "Wi-Fi Pineapples" are exemplars of
devices that could be used to impersonate and
intercept traffic within these networks ( Acuna
et al., 2017).
In considering these arguments, it is
proposed that opt-in services such as Telstra
Air, Fon, and Xfinity provide no greater levels
of security to users of public Wi-Fi services
when compared to traditional open Wi-Fi
hotspots. Network traffic on 'Air' remains
unencrypted and no mitigation strategies are
proposed to protect users from accessing rogue
access points. For the provider of the extended
service, little risk is apparent, as guest users sit
on the outer side of a separate network and all
guest activity is logged and associated back to
the guest's private broadband account. For the
consumer provider's private network, there
appears to be no change to the vulnerability
status beyond that which exists as a regular
end-user of Internet services.
The private
network remains as secure as the configuration
of their SoHo router is.

7. CONSUJVIER LEGAL
RISKS
The legal issues regarding the Internet and
Internet-related services are complex and the
following presentation of material is designed
to promote discussions about these issues.
Consumer liability hereafter is defined as the
burden of responsibility imposed on an adult
person to secure a Wi-Fi router owned or
operated by him or her. The test will be
whether a burden exists or may exist in
Australia in future years. Watkins (2013)
argues that although criminal liability for the
malicious actions of a third party accessing an
unsecure wireless network remain largely
ambiguous, cases have emerged whereby
unlikely individuals are being held accountable
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for the "negligent operation of a wireless
network." The pre-eminent case regarding
consumer liability and the provision of public
Wi-Fi networks took place in Germany in
2010. The case, 'Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony
Music Entertainment Germany GmbH' (2010)
has been well documented in several media
publications and law journals in Europe and
elsewhere. The case centred on a small music
store business that provided free Wi-Fi access
to its customers, some of whom used the
service to illegally download songs owned by
Sony Music Entertainment (Grieshaber, 2010).
'Sony' sought to sue Tobias McFadden, the
owner of the store, for indirectly breaching
copyright laws; by failing to prevent the use of
his
public
Wi-Fi
service
for
illegal
downloading. The German court made three
significant rulings in this case,
1. "Internet users need to secure their
private
wireless
connections
by
password to prevent unauthorized
people from using their web access to
illegally download data" (Grieshaber,
2010).
2. "Internet users can be fined up to euro
100 if a third party takes advantage of
their unprotected WLAN connection to
illegally download music or other files ,
the Karlsruhe-based court said in its
verdict" (Grieshaber, 2010).
3. The court did not find the provider of
the service, Tobias McFadden liable for
the criminal conduct, namely the
downloading of songs (Grieshaber,
2010).
In Australia at present, individuals and
businesses are not required by law to secure
SoHo routers, whether for private or extended
for public use, and therefore are not currently
legally liable for activity conducted by a third
party using it. However, to date, Australia has
not been challenged in the same way as seen in
the 'McFadden,' 'Sony' case, where breaches of
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copyright
occurred
through
individuals
accessing a third-party Wi-Fi service. More
recently, and despite the German court ruling
that passwords were required to secure private
networks, the German Government has
proposed new legislation designed to reduce the
burden of responsibility on business owners
and individuals providing public Wi-Fi
networks. The proposed legislation is to reflect
the German Government's position that
individuals and businesses are not liable for
illegal activity arising from Internet activity
they provide, as long as the service is only
made available to users, "who have declared
not to commit any rights violations in the
context of the use" (Out-Law.com, 2016). The
Australian Government may need begin
considering a similar approach in order to
protect Australian citizens who might be
unknowingly but similarly exposed to litigation
by large corporations imposing their copyright
protections. It is unclear whether the absence
of a requirement to secure Wi-Fi services is
sufficient to ward off these litigation attempts.
Placing the onus of responsibility on
consumers alone to adequately secure their
SoHo router is unreasonable, especially in the
absence of adequate instruction, adequate setup and configuration documentation, or any
legal requirement for developers, vendors or
ISPs to meet minimal security standards. If a
minimum standard of security is the desired
outcome, then the onus of responsibility should
be on developers, vendors, and ISP providers
who possess both the technical knowledge and
expertise to deploy devices that could comply
with set minimum-security standards. In
support of this assertion, a recent settlement
between ASUSTeK (ASUS) and the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is reviewed.
On 23 February 2016, the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) entered into a
settlement with ASUSTeK (ASUS) after it was
alleged that ASUS had failed to use
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'reasonable security' to protect consumers'
personal information that was exposed in a
security breach in February 2014. A total of
12,900 consumers' storage devices containing
personal data were exposed in the breach
(Charfoos, Feld, & Kadish, 2016). ASUS had
previously claimed that their routers "protect
consumers from any unauthorized access,
hacking, and virus attacks" and "protect [the]
local network against attacks from hackers"
(Charfoos et al. , 2016). Upon review, the
routers
were
shown to
have several
vulnerabilities in the firmware due to design
flaws
and
were
inadequately
secured.
Allegations that ASUS had also failed to notify
customers about how to mitigate the risks once
identified also formed part of the original
complaint (Charfoos et al. , 2016). The terms of
the settlement are comprehensive, with the
main outcomes including a requirement for
ASUS to introduce a comprehensive security
plan to ensure routers produced by them
"protects the privacy, security, confidentiality,
and integrity of information transmitted
through the routers" (Charfoos et al., 2016). In
addition, ASUS will be subjected to audits for
the next 20 years (Charfoos et al., 2016).
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•

•

•

•

•

8.FUTURE
RECOJVIJVIENDATIONS
Several recommendations are made m
accordance with the outcomes of this research.
A discussion is encouraged between policy
makers, ISPs, and vendors about the
introduction of legislation that places a burden
of responsibility on vendors, developers and
ISP providers to meet minimum-security
standards when selling or deploying SoHo
routers in Australia. It is suggested that at a
minimum standard should include:

•

Security
firmware
testing
firmware
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to be at the forefront of all
development, with increased
and transparency of all
placed into the public domain.

•

SoHo routers not to be deployed or sold
with default administrative usernames
and passwords. This could theoretically
minimise the exploitation of devices,
which are accessed using simplistic
brute-force approaches encompassing
common usernames and passwords.
Removing weak or obsolete Wi-Fi
security protocols that are known to be
easily exploitable and incorporating
WPA2 / AES security protocols as
standard.
SoHo routers to be deployed or sold
with remote administration disabled or
if enabled, clearly documented that it is
enabled (i.e. informing the end-user),
specifying why it is enabled, the
benefits and risks towards the consumer
of it being enabled and how it can be
disabled.
Improved methods for providing and
applying
firmware
updates,
and
consistent standards for vulnerability
disclosures and notifications to be
developed.
Minimum standards for content in user
manuals to be established. The
standard should clearly document what
information must be included in the
user
manual,
and
standardised
terminology that is easily understood
by the end-user agreed upon by ISPs
and vendors.
A significant increase in consumer
education and training
programs
regarding SoHo router security, risks
and mitigation strategies, and cyber
security in general.

SoHo router security is influenced through
both
technological
and
human
factor
challenges. For a lengthy period, end-users
have had the opportunity to control and
influence the state of security implemented and
used on routers. However, preceding research
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suggests that end-users do not always apply
optimum security practices on their router.
Furthermore, vendors do not necessarily
deploy
updates
or
address
security
vulnerabilities within a timely manner.
Subsequently,
aforementioned
the
recommendations enable routers to make use of
baseline security standards thus minimising
common and simple threats from targeting
routers, for instance bandwidth theft resulting
from open or WEP based wireless networks.
End-users can be continually encouraged and
influenced to make security conscious decision,
but history has demonstrated that convenience
will always be at the forefront of how
consumers utilise technology. Convenience,
coupled
with
end-users
lacking
an
understanding, will persistently result in nonideal practices being employed on routers. By
creating a secure standardised baseline, endusers are not given the opportunity to diminish
the state of security and thus forced to
conform to a minimal level of implemented
security.

9. CONCLUSION
It is evident that SoHo routers were not
designed by vendors with security at the
forefront of their development. In contrast
routers have undergone a rapid expansion of
add on features,
with
usability
and
functionality prioritised over security. The
consequences of this approach are easily
recognised with numerous vulnerabilities
embedded in the firmware exposing hundreds
of thousands, if not millions of consumers
around the world to attacks on a continual
basis. Search engines such as Shodan.io have
capitalised on publicly exposed weaknesses of
IoT devices. Strategic searches are easily used
to obtain detailed information about devices,
which may serve in assisting attackers to
identify and select vulnerable targets . As large
corporations move even further into creating
worlds conditioned by our online behaviours,
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collecting information about what consumers
do, where they go and why they do it , even
more of our lives will be exposed. ISPs are
expanding the geography of our connections.
Consumers are opting into ISP provisioned
services that engulf them in a web of public
hotspots they help to create. In Australia,
there is currently minimal publicly accessible
information on the security features enabled
upon deployment of ADSL routers used by
consumers to contribute to this expanded WiFi service. On the surface, it appears there are
advantages for the consumer knowing that all
guest connections are logged against the
guests'
private
account;
however,
no
information or discussion is available that
either describes or discusses mitigation
strategies to offset the risk of users joining
rogue hotspots.
To mitigate the ongoing and prevalent
issues identified m
this
paper, both
technological and human factors must be
altered to accommodate the novice end-users who make up a significant proportion of endusers in Australia. From a technological
perspective, security must be enforced, rather
than be optional. Router vendors are at the
fundamental level to support good security
practices. For instance, the option for an enduser to utilise the default authentication
credentials, during the initial configuration
process of the device, should not be restricted.
The selection of adequate passwords should be
enforced and enhanced through password
meters to demonstrate visually the soundness
of a password by today's standards.
Consumers must begin to understand the
risks involved in online environments and take
a legitimate interest in their security. While it
is unreasonable to transfer any technical
burden for securing devices, which are
inherently insecure onto consumers, they must
recognise the burden of risk they carry.
Consumers and policy makers must demand
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responsible action; they must insist that
security is at the forefront of all firmware
development. Governments and policy makers
must begin to enforce minimum-security
standards. These should outline the minimumsecurity features that are to be enabled on
upon the deployment of all ADSL SoHo
routers
to
the
general
population.
Unfortunately, too many consumers are at risk
because the window to their networks (and
their lives) is wide open, and sadly, many
consumers are misinformed with how easily
accessible they truly are.
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